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REVISITING ROBINSON: THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AS
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR THEORIES OF
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
JEFFREY A. RowE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Powell v. Texas' teaches us that the United States Supreme
Court will not interject itself into theoretical debates regarding
criminal responsibility via the Eighth Amendment2 as it once had done
in Robinson v. California.3'4 Nevertheless, the Court has shown that it
will interject itself into exactly this sort of debate when capital
punishment is involved,5 perhaps comforted by the fact that the
discussion will go no further than the death penalty because "death is
different.",6  Despite the Court's involvement in issues of capital
punishment, since Robinson was decided there have been very few
signs that the Court would even consider addressing the idea of a
substantive Eighth Amendment outside of the death penalty context.
7
In fact, the Court has said that the idea that the Eighth
Amendment has a general substantive component is "elemental[ly]
appeal[ling]," but cannot overcome the Court's increasing focus on the
actual process of criminal proceedings. 8  If the possibilities of
* B.A., University of Delaware; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law. Special
thanks to Dean Richard Boldt for his constructive criticism, and to Julie Rowe for her patience
and tolerance.
1. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII reads, in relevant part, "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
3. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
4. David Robinson, Jr., Powell v. Texas: The Case of the Intoxicated Shoeshine Man.
Some Reflections a Generation Later by a Participant, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 401,437 (1999).
5. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (the mentally retarded cannot
receive the death penalty); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (no child under 16 is
eligible for the death penalty); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (a non-triggerman
who did not attempt or intend to kill cannot be put to death); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (a rapist who does not murder his victim cannot be executed).
6. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
7. See, Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (claims of actual innocence are not
sufficient grounds for writ of habeas corpus); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
But see, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) and infra text accompanying notes 62-77.
8. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398 (holding that evidence of "innocence" or "guilt" must be
reviewed in a judicial proceeding).
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Robinson9 are resurrected, the Court would not be able to dismiss these
arguments with such little fanfare. Strengthening the substantive
theory put forth in Robinson could affect various aspects of our current
criminal law-which acts legislatures may choose to punish
criminally; whether presumptions, both rebuttable and irrebutable, are
constitutionally permissible; which of the Model Penal Code's mental
states are constitutionally acceptable; whether strict liability offenses
are constitutionally permissible; whether the felony-murder doctrine
and the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine will withstand Eighth
Amendment scrutiny; and whether some form of the insanity defense
is constitutionally protected.
This article will attempt to meet the challenge set out in Powell
by Justice Fortas, who wrote: "Our task is to determine whether the
principles embodied in the Constitution of the United States place any
limitations upon the circumstances under which punishment may be
inflicted."' l It will examine the possibilities of Robinson and show
that Powell did not completely foreclose the constitutional theory with
which Robinson tantalized scholars so many years ago. This paper
will then explain why courts should intervene into theoretical debates
over criminal responsibility and why the Eighth Amendment is a more
appropriate instrument to use than the Due Process Clause." It will
describe how the Eighth Amendment should operate and suggest three
methods for constitutionalizing that approach. Next, it will examine
how the suggested approach would impact certain aspects of the
current criminal law by discussing how the suggested approach would
affect the use of presumptions and how the Model Penal Code's
culpability standards could be utilized. Finally, it will address the
concern that some form of the insanity defense would be
constitutionally required 12 and examine how Idaho and Montana have
addressed this issue under their respective state constitutions.
9. For a description of the possibilities of Robinson see infra Part Ill.
10. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 565-66 (1968) (Fortas, J. dissenting).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 reads, in relevant part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
12 ... [A] form of the insanity defense would be made a constitutional
requirement throughout the Nation, should the Court now hold it cruel and
unusual to punish a person afflicted with any mental disease whenever his
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II. TEMPTATION & UNFULFILLED PROMISE
A. Why Robinson Was Promising
In Robinson, the United States Supreme Court held that a state
may not impose criminal punishment upon an addict for merely being
an addict as the Eighth Amendment requires that some act must have
been committed for the accused to be convicted.' 3  The Eighth
Amendment was violated not because of the punishment rendered, but
because the "crime" was not deserving of punishment. 14  In other
words, Robinson implied that legislatures could violate the Eighth
Amendment in one of two ways: (1) by criminalizing certain conduct,
or (2) by criminalizing non-conduct.
What made the Robinson decision so tempting to criminal law
theorists was that it was widely regarded as an omen-the Court was
about to define substantive criminal law more clearly, much in the
same way as it had recently begun to do with criminal procedure.
15
Specifically, scholars believed that Robinson was the Court's first step
toward holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the punishment
of morally blameless offenders.' 6  Additionally, given the Warren
Court's then-recent expansion of the Due Process Clause,17 there was
some speculation that the Due Process Clause would be used to further
the constitutionalization of retributive principles of criminal
responsibility theory as well. 18 Finally, the Court's previous holding
in Lambert v. California'9-that punishment resulting from
insufficient notice of an affirmative duty to register as a felon violated
Due Process20-gave scholars another reason to believe that a
relationship between the Constitution and substantive criminal law was
21
about to develop.
conduct was part of the pattern of his disease and occasioned by a compulsion
symptomatic of the disease.
Powell, 392 U.S. at 545 (1968) (Black, J. dissenting).
13. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
14. Id.
15. Joshua Dressier, Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Responsibility, and the Supreme Court:
How a Moderate Scholar Can Appear Immoderate Thirty Years Later, 74 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1507, 1509 (June, 1999).
16. Id. at 1510.
17. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. Dressier, supra note 15, at 1527.
19. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
20. Id. at 227.
21. Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96
MICH. L. REV. 1269 (March, 1998).
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The end result, of course, would be that a morally blameless
22offender could not be criminally punished at all. Therefore, society
would be forced to find another way to handle the juvenile, mentally
ill, mentally retarded, and/or chronically addicted offenders who
occupied, and continue to occupy, much of the Court's time and much
of the correctional system's space. The ultimate goal of this
anticipated reconstruction was to create a "more human, moral, and
altogether sounder substantive penal law."
23
B. Unfulfilled Promise
These lofty goals, however, remain unfulfilled. It is widely
accepted that Powell foreclosed what could have been a fascinating
line of constitutional jurisprudence merely six years after Robinson
24
was decided. Accordingly, most scholars believe Robinson has little
practical importance. 25 As David Robinson, a participant in Powell,
26
wrote:
The Robinson decision could plausibly have been seen
as a vital opening toward establishing lack of self-
control as a constitutional bar to punishment. But not
for long. Just a half dozen years later the Court closed
the door, holding in Powell v. Texas that it was not
cruel and unusual punishment to convict an alcoholic
27for the crime of public drunkenness.
Since Lambert and Robinson, the Court has not come close to
finding that the Eighth Amendment requires an offender to commit a
voluntary act before he or she may be punished.28 Modem scholarly
literature largely ignores the possibilities of Robinson2 9 and seems to
be content debating the Eighth Amendment's theoretical possibilities
in the capital punishment context.
22. Id. at 1283.
23. Id. at 1270.
24. Robinson, Jr., supra note 4, at 435.
25. Id.
26. Mr. Robinson argued the case for Texas in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.
27. Robinson, Jr., supra note 4, at 436.
28. Id. But see, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) and text accompanying
footnotes 62-77.
29. Bilionis, supra note 21, at 1299.
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Perhaps one reason for this widespread conclusion is the
Eighth Amendment's popularly accepted history.30  Although the
extent of the Framers' intentions is often debated, one thing scholars
agree upon is that the Eighth Amendment was intended to prohibit
certain draconian methods of punishment. 31 It is, however, far from
agreed upon that the Framers intended that certain moral theories of
punishment be adopted over others, if at all.32  The promises of
Robinson, therefore, were discarded with little fanfare.
III. POSSIBILITIES OF ROBINSON
As discussed previously, the Robinson Court held that the
Eighth Amendment is violated when a state imprisons an individual
for a status offense that does not require the state to prove a specific
act. 33 If the case is to have any meaningful precedential value, one
must engage in a little bit of vote-counting. Only eight Justices
participated in the case and the plurality opinion was signed by only
four Justices. Of the two concurring opinions, one focused on the
actus reus requirement, 34 and the other was concerned with the status
prong. 3
5
Since each prong received the assent of five justices, Robinson
can be read to mandate two requirements. First, although the
proposition may seem fairly obvious, it can be inferred that the Eighth
Amendment requires an actus reus in order to impose punishment.
Second, legislatures cannot criminalize "status" offenses such as
illness or mental deficiency. Each requirement should be examined
separately in order to fully realize what Robinson stands for and where
it could lead us.
Regarding the actus reus prong, perhaps the aspect of
Robinson's conviction that most disturbed the plurality was the fact
that California did not actually have to prove that he had used,
30. The Supreme Court has also acknowledged a second, theoretical history that is
lesser-known, but on which the logic of Robinson relies. See notes 62-72.
31. Dressier, supra note 15, at 1516. But see, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958);
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349
(1910).
32. Dressler, supra note 15, at 1516.
33. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
34. Id. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35. "Cruel and unusual punishment results not from confinement, but from convicting
the addict of a crime." Id. at 676 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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possessed, or attempted to possess narcotics while in the state. 36 The
trial judge even instructed the jury to base their verdict on whether
they believed that the defendant was addicted, not on whether he
committed any act.37 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion shows that
he also was concerned with the lack of affirmative action from the
defendant.38 Harlan stated that evidence of the defendant's addiction
at most showed a propensity to aspire to commit an illegal act, but an
act was still necessary in order for Robinson to be punished
criminally. 
39
Regarding the status prong, the plurality, along with Justice
Douglas, the author of the other concurring opinion, could not fathom
how those who have a disease or an addiction could be punished
simply for that status. 40  Douglas compared drug addiction to
insanity.4' While he assented to confining citizens so afflicted for
treatment or societal protection, for him the criminal classification was
more than the Eighth Amendment could tolerate.42 The majority,
although not analogizing to insanity, agreed that imposing criminal
punishment on a diseased individual would be cruel and unusual.43
Douglas eloquently summarized this prong of Robinson when he
wrote, "We would forget the teachings of the Eighth Amendment if we
allowed sickness to be made a crime and permitted sick people to be
punished for being sick. This age of enlightenment cannot tolerate
such barbarous action."
44
IV. THE DOOR IS STILL OPEN: BUILDING UPON ROBINSON
Powell itself leaves room for the lessons of Robinson to be
invoked and expanded upon. The Powell majority cites the cases
widely regarded as the basis for proportionality analysis 45 to state that
36. Id. at 666.
37. Id. at 662.
38. Id. at 678-79. (Harlan, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring).
40. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 674.
41. Id. at 668-78 (Douglas, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 668-69 (Douglas, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 666.
44. Id. at 678 (Douglas, J. concurring).
45. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947); Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Ironically, these are the same
cases cited in Ingraham for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment imposes substantive
limits on what actions legislatures can punish criminally.
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the cruel and unusual punishment clause applies more to the method of
punishment than to the reason for which the punishment is rendered.46
This view, however, ignores the underlying foundation for
proportionality-the punishment must be proportionate to the crime.
It should be noted that the vast majority of the Court's proportionality
discussion has taken place in the death penalty context, where moral
blameworthiness is conceded. It seems rather odd that the Powell
majority would cite cases where moral blameworthiness is assumed,
for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment focuses on
methodology rather than the acts that trigger the punishment.
At the very least, Robinson requires an act before it can be
deemed that a crime occurred.47  While the Court has not explicitly
announced a voluntary act requirement, 48 one can be inferred, either
from Lambert, where the Court invalidated a statute containing "no
element of willfulness, 49  or from centuries of common law
development.5 °
A. Powell Committed a Voluntary Act
Other than this theoretical inconsistency discussed above,
perhaps the most obvious point in arguing that Powell did not
foreclose an expansive reading of Robinson is that Mr. Powell, unlike
Mr. Robinson, did commit an act. Without discussing the issue of
whether to recognize drunkenness as an excusable form of diminished
capacity-which also troubled the Powell plurality-Justice Marshall
treated Powell's public appearance as a voluntary act that satisfied the
act component in the crime of public intoxication.5' As noted by
46. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1968).
47. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring).
48. "... nor was there any exploration of the meaning or purposes of a volitional action
requirement being imposed by the Constitution." Robinson, Jr., supra note 4, at 408.
49. Lambert, 355 U.S. 227.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 106-16 for a discussion of common law
development. Regarding Lambert, it has been read narrowly as requiring notice of an
affirmative duty before someone can be punished criminally for breaching that duty.
Proponents of a substantive Eighth Amendment would argue that notice is merely a
prerequisite to forming intent. In other words, one cannot intend to violate the law without
knowing that he or she has such an opportunity. It should be noted that adoption of this notice
theory logically requires that the Court have adopted Natural Law theory - notice is not
required for those offenses that are either (a) morally wrong per se, or (b) commonly known to
be illegal. This theory does not comport with the common law notion that ignorance is not an
excuse for violating the law. Since the Court has not overtly adopted such a theory, it is
presumed that Lambert must be read as applying to more than just those few circumstances
where an offender violates an affirmative duty.
51. Powell, 392 U.S. at 532.
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Justice Black, Robinson applies only when the conviction does not
require conduct to be proven;52 therefore, the Court correctly decided
that the act prong of Robinson should not be extended.
Furthermore, as the plurality opinion accurately notes, Powell
does not fall within the reach of Robinson because Powell was not
convicted for the "status" of being a chronic alcoholic.53 Rather than
punishing a status or a non-act, Texas "has imposed upon appellant a
criminal sanction for public behavior which may create substantial
health and safety hazards, both for appellant and for members of the
general public." 54  An extension of the status prong of Robinson,
therefore, was inappropriate.
55
B. Focus on Defining Disease
The Powell court centered most of its efforts on addressing the
definitional concern associated with the status prong of Robinson.
This concern was well-founded given the fact that the Robinson court
made no attempt to define the specific qualifications for an addiction
or disease for constitutional purposes. Based on the testimony of
Powell's expert, it is unclear whether even one member of the medical
profession was comfortable anointing alcoholism a disease. 57  Dr.
Wade testified that Powell's alcoholism was an "exceedingly strong
influence" on his behavior, but did not "complete[ly] overpower" his
free will.58 Accordingly, the Court did not feel that it was appropriate
to classify alcoholism as a status under Robinson when medical
professionals were not willing to substantiate that leap.59
In sum, the plurality's unwillingness to adopt the dissenters'
suggested holding, that a person cannot be punished for acting in a
way consistent with a disease from which he is suffering, 60 takes
nothing away from Robinson. First, Powell committed an act,
appearing in public while intoxicated, which the state had ample
reason to punish criminally.61 Second, the Robinson majority did not
fully enumerate what qualifies as a "disease." A more detailed,
52. Powell, 392 U.S. at 542 (Black, J. concurring).
53. Id. at 532.
54. Id. at 532.
55. Id. at 521.
56. Robinson, Jr., supra note 4, at 408.
57. Powell, 392 U.S. at 524.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 537.
60. Id. at 521.
61. Id. at 532.
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expert-informed analysis in Powell led the Court to conclude that
alcoholism did not satisfy the still unstated legal definition of
"disease."
The Powell analysis can most accurately be described as an
attempt to reign in the status prong of Robinson. The Court astutely
recognized that "disease" was not clearly defined and took logical
steps to prevent this prong from expanding into areas in which it might
not be appropriate. What is clear, however, is that Powell did not
attempt to restrain Robinson's act prong; rather, Powell reinforced the
act requirement by showing how it is satisfied. In sum, Powell merely
thwarted the unwise, unclear expansion of Robinson's status prong.
C. The Lesson from Ingraham and Weems
The Court provided some indication that Robinson was still
alive and well when it decided Ingraham v. Wright.62 The Ingraham
court discussed an alternate history of the Eighth Amendment, one that
made the logical connection between methods of punishment and
reasons for punishment. 63 Citing Weems v. U.S., 64 which, ironically,
was cited by the Powell majority for the opposite proposition, the
Ingraham court stated that the Framers were not only troubled by the
rack and the iron maiden, but were also concerned with limiting the
grounds for which the legislature could impose punishment. 65 The
Court went even further by stating that the Framers' principal concern
was how legislatures would define crimes and punishments.
66
These concerns were discussed at length in Justice McKenna's
majority opinion in Weems.67 McKenna noted that the Framers, in
writing a document that they hoped would be the foundation of a long-
lasting governmental structure, intended the Constitution to enforce
broader principles, as opposed to narrow prohibitions. 68 While the
Framers undoubtedly were concerned with the methods used to punish
convicts, they must have realized that, over time, legislatures would
62. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
63. It is an alternate history as opposed to the "methods of punishment" history
discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 30-32.
64. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
65. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 665 (1977) (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 371-73).
66. Id. at 665 (citing In re: Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446-47).
67. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 357-82.
68. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373. While Justice McKenna's belief is certainly logical, one
must wonder how it would apply in the context of the Third Amendment, which has been
largely dormant since its ratification.
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find other ways to violate the principles behind the Eighth
Amendment.69
With power in a legislature great, if not unlimited, to
give criminal character to the actions of men, with
power unlimited to fix terms of imprisonment with
what accompaniments they might, what more potent
instrument of cruelty could be put into the hands of
power? And it was believed that power might be
tempted to cruelty. This was the motive of the clause,
and if we are to attribute an intelligent providence to its
advocates we cannot think that it was intended to
prohibit only practices like the Stuarts', or to prevent
only an exact repetition of history. We cannot think
that the possibility of a coercive cruelty being exercised
through other forms of punishment was overlooked. v
Constitutions are meant to establish principles to be used
through the ages.7 ' Justice McKenna feared that if this basic tenet of
constitutional drafting was forgotten, then, "general principles would
have little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and
lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality."
7 2
With this historical and precedential perspective as a
springboard, the Ingraham court stated that one way in which the
Eighth Amendment affects the criminal process is through the act
requirement of Robinson.73 More specifically, the Eighth Amendment
"imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and
punished as such.",74 This statement, when combined with the Court's
reasoning in Weems, proves that the Court, as recently as 1977, did not
hold Robinson to the narrow reading that many often attribute to it-
that the act and status requirements are inseparable. The Ingraham
court believed not only that the requirements were independent of one
another, but that the act requirement still plays a crucial role in the
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 7
69. Id. at 372-73.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 373.
72. Id.
73. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667.
74. Id.
75. It should be noted that the issue before the Court in Ingraham was whether the
Eighth Amendment prevented public school employees from utilizing corporal punishment.
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The Eighth Amendment summary given by the Ingraham court
also alludes to quasi-textual support for a substantive Eighth
Amendment. 76  The amendment states that, "cruel and unusual
punishments [shall not be] inflicted., 77  A logical premise of that
assertion is that it would be cruel and unusual to inflict punishment for
certain acts. This is the premise on which the act prong of Robinson
relies, and the premise that is reaffirmed via application in Powell and
via summary in Ingraham.
V. WHY COURTS SHOULD INTERVENE
Perhaps the most obvious objection to the suggested reading of
Robinson, and the expansion of that principle, is that defining criminal
acts is a task that should be left to the legislature. Answering the
question of why the courts should infringe upon what is widely
perceived to be a realm of legislative primacy is the next hurdle for
anyone hoping to advance a constitutionally based theory of criminal
responsibility. The simple answer is that: (1) the common law
tradition has always entrusted courts with developing the law; and (2)
it is the nature of constitutional law that the Court, under the authority
granted by the U.S. Constitution, restrain the various legislatures from
violating that document. These traditions have continued through the
current age where courts have the responsibility not only to fill in gaps
that the legislature may not have anticipated, but also to prevent the
legislature from abusing its broad definitional powers.78
A. Legislative Inaction & Insular Minorities
At least one scholar has expressed disappointment at how little
the various legislatures have done to address the Robinson court's
concerns in the decades since that decision, 79 especially considering
that Robinson should have served as a warning to legislatures that the
Court would soon invade their legislative province. This legislative
The Court did not spend much time on this issue before dismissing it and moving on to others,
but did take the time to offer the brief summary discussed here.
76. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664-66.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
78. Other aspects of the counter-majoritarian difficulty that arise in a substantial
proportion of constitutional cases are beyond the scope of this paper as the topic has been
more than adequately addressed by other authors.
79. Dressier, supra note 15, at 1508.
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void can be explained by the fact that deciding which offenders should
be held criminally responsible is not the kind of task with which
legislatures usually occupy themselves. 80 Deciding which acts should
be punished within an existing system is a far lesser task than defining
the juridical limits of that system. The latter is the essence of
constitutional law, not everyday legislative action.
This history of legislative inaction shows that legislatures are
unlikely to devote the necessary time and effort to make the
distinctions necessary to administer a principled system of criminal
responsibility. Henry Hart was also concerned with the degree to
which political pandering may affect the legislature's sense of
justice. After all, it would be foolish for any prospective legislator to
campaign on promises that she will strive to develop a justice system
that will most likely result in placing limits on ways the legislature can
deal with future societal problems. Both of these concerns are grounds
for establishing constitutional boundaries for legislatures, thereby
permitting the judiciary to use the Eighth Amendment as a check for
legislative action.
8 3
One way to limit legislative power is to take an approach
similar to the one advocated in Carolene Products84 regarding
"discrete and insular minorities." 85 Discrete and insular minorities-
groups identifiable by an immutable characteristic and with little
political clout-require special protection because of the prejudice
from which they frequently suffer and their inability to utilize the
political system to level the playing field through legislative means.
86
The political process may even systematically disadvantage such
87groups to appease a dominant majority. This concern can be seen in
the status prong of Robinson-the Court's condemnation of status
offenses can theoretically be extended to groups of discrete and insular
minorities (the mentally retarded, the insane, the addicted, etc.).
The approach laid out in Carolene Products was utilized later
in Thompson v. Oklahoma,88 where the Court intervened on behalf of
juvenile offenders to hold that juveniles who were under the age of
80. Kent Greenawalt, "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth Amendment:
Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 974 (1969).
81. Id. at976.
82. Bilionis, supra note 21, at 1276 (discussing Hart).
83. Id.
84. U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
85. Bilionis, supra note 21, at 1328.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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sixteen when they committed murder cannot be executed. 89 Regarding
criminal responsibility, the Court found that juveniles are not capable
of appreciating the full consequences of their actions; therefore,
juveniles should not be punished on a par with adults who have fully
developed this capacity.9° In other words, the Court, acting on behalf
of a group with little political clout (juveniles), invalidated a
legislative enactment in spite of great public support for the law.
9 1
The Court in Thompson also identified how one of Hart's
concerns had come to fruition-legislative inconsistency creating a
seemingly unprincipled punishment system.92  The Court discussed
how the law has historically subjected juveniles to lesser punishment
because of their imperfect decision-making skills.93 Previously, that
reasoning had been ignored in the death penalty context. Therefore,
the Court intervened by making a distinction symbolic of a well-
reasoned, consistent constitutional theory of criminal responsibility.
B. Why the Eighth Amendment is Preferable to the Due Process
Clause
Of course, the Carolene Products doctrine, while tangentially
applicable to Eighth Amendment analysis, was developed in the
substantive due process context. The logical question is why the
Eighth Amendment should be used to limit the various legislatures
instead of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.94 The
simple answer is that the text of the Eighth Amendment, and the
89. Id. at 838. Recently, the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of convicted murderers who were under the age of eighteen when the
crime was committed. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005).
90. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 n.23. (1988).
91. It should be noted that the Court based its holding, in part, on the existence of a
"national consensus" against executing juveniles. Id. at 823-31. However, this issue is one
where public opinion was not reflected in the statutes. Therefore, the Court's ruling in
Thompson could be characterized accurately as a preemptive use of the Carolene Products
doctrine since a revision of the states' respective juvenile execution laws was, given
overwhelming public opinion, a distinct possibility.
92. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824-3 1.
93. Id. at 823-31.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I reads, in relevant part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
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underlying logical premises that were addressed earlier,95 provide
more textual restraint than the oft-criticized Due Process Clause.96 As
Justice Blackmun once stated, "[The] Due Process Clause ... is a
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from
all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints." 97 In
light of this broad standard, any court is more likely to find the
language of the Eighth Amendment-which is topically restricted-to
be a more attractive means of addressing moral blameworthiness and
other theories.
Hart believed that a doctrine of criminal responsibility lies
within the framework of the various constitutional amendments.98 In
Hart's view, the Constitution takes the word "crime" seriously. He
believed that a Griswold-like penumbra argument could be made to
support such a theory. 99 Hart asserted that the Constitution's various
mentions of "crime" in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments were indicative of a greater idea of constitutional
substantive criminal law that relied on individual blameworthiness.
100
The rational extension of this idea is to provide the Supreme Court
with an obligation to enforce the substantive criminal framework that
underlies the Constitution.
10
'
Professor Bilionis explains the various deficiencies involved in
Hart's proposed use of the Due Process Clause.'0 2  First, Hart has
stretched the "unmistakable indications" too far; the amendments
establish procedural safeguards and do not even allude to substantive
limitations. 1° 3 Second, decisions made on grounds of substantive due
process are frequently criticized because of the exacerbated counter-
majoritarian difficulty inherent in all decisions made with little textual
support. 104 Third, such an approach completely ignores the process-
based relationship between the Constitution and the criminal law to
95. See supra text accompanying notes 62-72.
96. Of course, the Eighth Amendment applies to the states by virtue of incorporation
through the Fourteenth Amendment. For simplicity's sake, this article will speak in terms of
the Eighth Amendment applying to the states directly.
97. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 436 (1993) (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (citing
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
98. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
431 (1958).
99. Id. at 431-435.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See generally, Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive
Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269 (March, 1998).
103. Id. at 1284.
104. Id. at 1318.
Revisiting Robinson
which the Court has clung so tightly in recent years.' 0 5 In sum, use of
the Due Process Clause is less likely to garner significant support than
the comparatively textually-appealing Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause.
VI. A PROPOSAL: HOW THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT SHOULD BE USED
Professor Bilionis notes that in order to be successful, a
constitutional theory of criminal responsibility must be based on some
fundamental principle from which doctrine can develop.' °6  Moral
blameworthiness, as espoused by Hart, is a logical place to start given
its centuries-long development in the common law, the Court's
allusions to it in Robinson and Lambert, and its ability to comport with
the logical premise underlying the Eighth Amendment. Such a system
can be established by extending these decisions, which must be done
in order to refute the Powell majority's assertion that, "this Court has
never articulated a general constitutional doctrine of mens rea.
' 107
Since Powell restrained only the status prong of Robinson, the Court is
not otherwise precluded from adding a mens rea component to
Robinson's act requirement.
Hart suggests that moral blameworthiness is what separates
criminal sanctions from civil sanctions.10 8  Only those actions that
trigger the moral condemnation of the community can be designated as
"crimes" and punished criminally. 109 In other words, conduct is not a
crime merely because a legislature says it is or because public officials
feel a duty to suppress it; it is a crime when the community feels so
morally repulsed by the act that it feels the need to formally condemn
it. 110  An offender who commits such an act, therefore, is morally
blameworthy and can be punished criminally for her actions after it is
proven that she (1) committed such an act and (2) is punishable. " '
Moral blameworthiness, therefore, "can be argued to be a
necessary condition, although not a sufficient one, for punishment." ' 2
105. Id. See generally, Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
106. Bilionis, supra note 21, at 1308.
107. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968).
108. Hart, supra note 98, at 404.
109. Dressier, supra note 15, at 1511-12.
110. Hart, supra note 98, at 406.
111. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (W. Hastie translation 1887) 194-95.
By "punishable," Kant means that the offender would be able to appreciate the reason for, and
nature of, her punishment.
112. Greenawalt, supra note 80, at 940.
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This principle certainly cannot be criticized for lacking common sense.
Those who cannot conform their conduct to the law are not morally
blameworthy and, therefore, should not be condemned; those who can,
should. 1 3 Such an approach serves as a constitutional limitation on
legislatures, but still allows the Court to keep its distance and refrain
from broadly rewriting the law.'
1 4
Herbert Packer once remarked that the Court thought that,
"mens rea is an important requirement, but it is not a constitutional
requirement, except sometimes.""1 5  This inconsistency could be
remedied rather easily. Powell does not prevent Robinson from being
extended in this manner. Furthermore, the Court can use the
"centuries-long evolution" of the doctrines of actus reus, mens rea,
insanity, mistake, justification, and duress to guide them in the
constitutionalization of substantive criminal law.' 
16
A. Actus Reus and Mens Rea as Instruments of Moral
Blameworthiness
As was mentioned previously, Robinson created an actus reus
requirement that was reaffirmed in Powell and again in Ingraham.
The theoretical basis for this requirement has been aptly described by
Glanville Williams, who wrote: "[that] crime requires an act is
invariably true if the proposition be read as meaning that a private
thought is not sufficient to found responsibility."'1 17 The Supreme
Court has shown no signs of backtracking on this prong, but the
recognition of a mens rea element is a greater battle.
Historically, the common law has recognized the crucial role
that mens rea plays in criminal responsibility and moral
blameworthiness. The idea that a crime has not been committed unless
the offender willfully desired to cause harm has long played a role in
the development of the criminal law.' 18 Justice Holmes acknowledged
this fact when he wrote that the intention was not "to deny that
criminal liability, as well as civil, is founded on blameworthiness.
Such a denial would shock the moral sense of any civilized community
113. Dressier, supra note 15, at 1528.
114. Id.
115. Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107.
116. Powell, 392 U.S. at 535-36.
117. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW - THE GENERAL PART 1 (1961) as excerpted in Powell,
392 U.S. at 543 n.4 (Black, J. concurring).
118. State v. Korell, 213 Mont. 316, 328-29 (1984).
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.... ,,119 Historically, the mens rea element has served as the means by
which the legal system recognizes moral blameworthiness.' Despite
this statement by one of its most lauded members, and the role that
mens rea has historically played as the embodiment of
blameworthiness in the criminal context, the Court has never held
mens rea to be a hard and fast constitutional requirement.'
2
'
Lambert is as close as the Court has ever come to deeming
mens rea a constitutional requirement. Lambert's holding, however, is
more accurately read as requiring the offender to act affirmatively or
in open defiance of a statutorily imposed duty. 122  Of course, an
offender must have some intent to openly defy a statutorily imposed
duty; therefore, intent could be viewed as an underlying requirement to
the Lambert court's notice-based holding. In sum, the Court has come
close to establishing a mens rea requirement, but has never taken the
final step.
B. Benefits of Utilizing the Eighth Amendment in This Manner
Determining what makes an act a crime is a fundamental part
of criminal law. The advent of strict liability offenses has
demonstrated the truth of the sarcastic answer offered by many wag
professors-whatever the legislature says is a crime. To most criminal
theorists, including Henry Hart, "so vacant a concept is a betrayal of
intellectual bankruptcy." Adopting the mens rea and actus reus
requirements via the Eighth Amendment would give criminal law the
substantive background that Hart desired. It would also help to restore
the notion that criminal convictions should result only from conduct
that society condemns on moral grounds. 1
24
As Justice Black noted in his Powell concurrence, the main
benefit of an act requirement is to protect against false charges. 25 For
instance, the fear of false charges is exhibited in evidence law's
119. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 231 (1957) (quoting HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW, at 49-50).
120. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 102 (1995). Mens rea
"suggests a general notion of moral blameworthiness, i.e. that the defendant committed the
actus reus of an offense with a moral blameworthy state of mind." Id.
121. Powell, 392 U.S. at 535.
122. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229.
123. Hart, supra note 98, at 404.
124. Id.
125. Powell, 392 U.S. at 543 (Black, J. concurring) (citing 4 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 21).
20051
112 U. of Md. L. J. of Race, Religion, Gender & Class [Vol. 5:95
distrust of propensity evidence. 126  Evidence law acknowledges that
people do not always repeat their past conduct, let alone consistently
take advantage of certain opportunities that a person of their alleged
character would find attractive. 127  Additionally, it would be
exceedingly difficult to defend charges that are not based on an act.
128
Defendants would be limited to refuting behavior patterns and
personality traits. The act requirement prohibits propensity-based
crimes, thereby easing the burdens of both prosecutors and defense
attorneys.'
29
Justice Black also addresses the act requirement's function of
shielding unfulfilled thoughts and desires from being the basis of
criminal prosecution.' Conduct serves as an objective manifestation
of intent; it differentiates between actual intention and daydreams or
passing thoughts. In other words, a constitutional requirement of
conduct would prohibit propensity-based statutes, as well as bar
legislation attempting to punish those who have criminal thoughts, but
do not act upon them.
1 31
VII. THREE METHODS FOR CONSTITUTIONALIZING SUBSTANTIVE
THEORY VIA THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
A. An Activist Approach
Kent Greenawalt has proposed an activist approach that would
enable courts to take the principle of blameworthiness and cut wide
swaths into existing law. 132  This incarnation would hold
126. Id.
127. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b) which reads, in relevant part:
Other crimes, wrongs or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by
the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice
on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial.
128. Powell, 392 U.S. at 543 (1968) (Black, J. concurring) (citing 4 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 21).
129. Id. at 544.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 543 (citing WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW -THE GENERAL PART 1 (1961)).
132. Dressler, supra note 15, at 1529.
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blameworthiness above all other policy concerns by constitutionalizing
various defenses. "Any defendant would have a constitutional right to
show that he either had no reason to suppose he was doing wrong or
lacked the power to avoid doing wrong, or that punishment of him
would serve no useful purpose."' 133  Defendants would have a
constitutional right to make a narrow ignorance of law argument,
somewhat along the lines of Lambert, as well as arguments based on
mistake of law. 134 Additionally, strict liability offenses would never
result in incarceration.' 
35
Such a role, however, does not seem justified given the relative
vagueness of the Eighth Amendment's language.' As mentioned
previously, the counter-majoritarian difficulty would require the Court
to create a standard to limit itself. The Court has struggled to create
such a limiting standard in its substantive due process jurisprudence
due to the broad manner in which that clause has been interpreted.
137
The Eighth Amendment's language is substantially more specific than
the language in the Due Process Clause, but the absence of a textually-
based limiting principle is no less troubling.
B. Focus on Proportionality
A second option would be to extend the Court's proportionality
jurisprudence beyond the death penalty context. Although the Court
has not explicitly used the term, Kantian retributive theory (also
known as "just deserts" theory) has provided the framework for this
line of case law; therefore, moral blameworthiness is inherent in the
Court's proportionality jurisprudence. 138 The theory is based on the
idea that, "[p]unishment should be directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal defendant."' 39 Put differently, the offender
should get the punishment he deserves-no more, no less. This
133. Greenawalt, supra note 80, at 975.
134. Dressier, supra note 15, at 1530.
135. Id.
136. Dressier, supra note 15, at 1529.
137. The Court has attempted to limit its due process jurisprudence through an analysis of
"history and tradition," but this standard has proven to be too malleable to serve as a true
limiting principle.
138. For example, "[t]hose mentally retarded persons who meet the law's requirements
for criminal responsibility should be tried and punished when they commit crimes. Because of
their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, however, they
do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduct." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002).
139. Id. at 319; California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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concept is the heart of the Court's proportionality analysis and is
inherently retributive in nature. It has been used to invalidate the
death sentence of a getaway driver because he had no involvement in
the actual murder of the victims,14 ° to strike the death sentence of a 15-
year-old offender because of his lesser ability to control and appreciate
his conduct, 14 1 and to prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded
due to their deficient reasoning, judgment, and ability to control their
conduct.14 2 Such an approach would not require the Court to explicitly
adopt a mens rea requirement or reinforce the act requirement of
Robinson.
It is highly doubtful that the Court would extend the
proportionality doctrine to non-capital cases in a meaningful
manner. 14 3 If the Court were to utilize proportionality in a broader
context, some substantive theory would sneak into the Constitution,
similar to the way that the substantive theories of retribution and
deterrence have openly emerged in the Court's capital punishment
jurisprudence. 144  However, the counter-majoritarian difficulty is
problematic once again; it is unclear how the Court would limit itself
once it invokes proportionality outside of the death penalty context.
C. The Seventh Amendment Model
One possible approach to utilizing the Eighth Amendment
substantively, is to tailor the limitation in a fashion similar to the
manner in which the Seventh Amendment has been limited.145 The
Supreme Court has limited the Seventh Amendment by holding that a
civil jury is guaranteed only in causes of action that were either
recognized at the time the amendment was ratified or causes of action
substantially similar to those recognized when the amendment was
ratified. 146 Interpreting the Eighth Amendment in a similar fashion
would result in the Court setting constitutional limits in accordance
140. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
141. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988).
142. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
143. See, Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (sentence of life without parole for
possession of a large amount of narcotics with intent to distribute is not disproportionate). But
see, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (sentence of over twenty years for possession of a
relatively small amount of marijuana is unconstitutionally disproportionate).
144. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11
(2003); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808
(1991); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
145. Greenawalt, supra note 80, at 974-75.
146. Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 446-47 (1830).
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with rules that were accepted by the common law at the time the
Constitution was founded. This approach would require very little
judicial involvement, perhaps no more than formally adopting actus
reus and mens rea, and would likely be favored by even the more
conservative justices who have espoused an affinity for retributive
theory and historically-founded jurisprudence. 148
Although debatable, it is not likely that the adoption of this
formulation of the Eighth Amendment would mandate
constitutionalizing the insanity defense. 149 There is little doubt that a
mens rea requirement would permit the admission of any evidence
tending to prove that a defendant did not or could not have met that
requirement. For centuries, evidence of mental illness has been
admitted for exactly this purpose.1
50
VIII. REMEDYING LIMITATION CONCERNS
Before Powell, many scholars believed that Robinson
supported a broad reading of the Eighth Amendment that would result
in the Court announcing substantive constitutional limitations for
criminal law. 5 1 This proposition did not sit well in many circles,
including the Supreme Court itself.152 The Powell majority made this
clear when they noted that if Robinson were so viewed, the doctrine
would be limitless; there would be no end to the Court's power to
constitutionalize theories of criminal responsibility.' 53 In other words,
if the Eighth Amendment were to be used as a vehicle to establish
substantive requirements, the Court would need a brake to compliment
the acceleration provided by Robinson. 1
54
The Court voiced these limitation concerns using the language
of federalism155-- criminal law is an area that has largely been left to
147. Id.
148. Dressier, supra note 15, at 1528-29.
149. See infra text accompanying notes 203-19 for a more detailed discussion of this
issue.
150. State v. Korell, 213 Mont. 316, 329 (1984).
151. Dressier, supra note 15, at 1527.
152. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968).
153. Id. at 533-34. Justice Black also voiced limitation concerns: "The criminal law is a
social tool that is employed in seeking a wide variety of goals, and I cannot say the Eighth
Amendment's limits on the use of criminal sanctions extend as far as this viewpoint would
inevitably carry them." Powell, 392 U.S. at 545 (Black, J., concurring).
154. Dressier, supra note 15, at 1516-17.
155. Powell, 392 U.S. at 535.
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the states. 156  It was not until the 1960s, when the Court decided a
significant number of criminal procedure cases, that the Court
substantially involved itself in the area of criminal justice
administration using something other than the Due Process Clause. 
157
As a result of the Court's restraint, states have developed all of the
various principles within the criminal law in accordance with the
"constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving
aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical,
and medical views of the nature of man."'15 8 It is only natural that the
Supreme Court should be leery of involving itself in an area that the
states have developed for over two-hundred years.
However, these federalism-based concerns did not prevent the
Court from intervening in matters of criminal procedure. The Court
recognized a need to establish constitutional minimums and did so,
even after 150 years of non-intervention. Limitation concerns were
minimal, perhaps because of the language of the Fourth,
1 59 Fifth, 60
and Sixth amendments.16 1  These amendments were written with
relatively specific language that clearly showed the Framers' intention
156. Bilionis, supra note 21, at 1315.
157. Id. (discussing Justice White's opinion in Patterson). See also, Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952).
158. Powell, 392 U.S. at 535-36 (1968).
159. U.S. CONST. amend. IV reads, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
160. U.S. CONST. amend. V reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
161. U.S. CONST. amend. VI reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
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to establish constitutional minimums; the Constitution clearly provided
limits for judicial intervention. 62
The principle being espoused here, that the Eighth Amendment
implies that the legislature cannot criminalize certain activities, is not
explicitly limited by the Amendment's text. When considering this
implied understanding, the Eighth Amendment is more comparable to
the Seventh Amendment,' 63 which also lacks any sort of limiting
language. The Court has limited the Seventh Amendment by holding
that a jury trial is only required for claims recognized at common law,
or similar to those recognized at common law, when the Bill of Rights
was ratified. 164 Because of the Court's federalism-based concerns, the
concerns regarding limiting judicial law-making generally, and the
practical similarities to the Seventh Amendment, the Court would be
wise to limit the Eighth Amendment in a similar manner. This
approach would allow the Court to set a constitutional floor for
criminal responsibility, yet still permit the states to exceed these
minimum standards and continue developing the vast majority of
criminal responsibility doctrine. '
65
IX. APPLICATION OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT-LIKE SOLUTION
As was discussed previously, the quasi-Seventh Amendment
approach would require the Court to hold mens rea and actus reus as
formal requirements under the Eighth Amendment. 166  Again, the
Court has already addressed actus reus in Robinson, Powell, and
Ingraham, and has alluded to a mens rea requirement in its capital
punishment decisions.167 Most recently in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court
reinforced this requirement by holding that mentally retarded persons
162. These types of federalism arguments became significant only after the Court began
incorporating the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth amendments. The larger debate of incorporation's
impact on federalist theory is well beyond the scope of this paper.
163. U.S. CONST. amend. VII reads, "In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law."
164. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235 (1819).
165. See generally, Harmelin v. Michigan 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (holding that a life
sentence for possession of a large quantity of narcotics with intent to distribute is not
constitutionally disproportionate). See also People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (1992)
(holding that the sentencing scheme examined in Harmelin violates the Michigan
Constitution).
166. See supra text accompanying note 148.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61, 117-22, 138-42.
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cannot be put to death due to their inability to "act with the level of
moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduct."168
Atkins, as well as the other cases within the Court's
proportionality jurisprudence, 16 9 suggests a more strategic advantage
to advocating the quasi-Seventh Amendment approach. The Court has
made no attempt to hide its affinity for retributive theory in its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. 170  Many commentators have also noted
the Rehnquist Court's overt championing of federalism and non-
intervention policy when states' rights are concerned. 17 1 Given this
background, it would be strategically sound for substantive Eighth
Amendment advocates to encourage an approach that requires minimal
judicial intervention, preserves state control of substantive law
development, and at the same time appeals to a theory in which the
Court obviously finds merit.
U.S. v. McLamb is an example of how this approach would
appeal to the Court's existing tendencies.172  Mr. McLamb was
convicted of structuring a transaction to avoid federal reporting
requirements. 173 Specifically, he allowed automobile buyers to make
several payments under $10,000 at the time of purchase in order to
avoid having to notify the IRS of the transaction. 174  The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected his argument that the Eighth
168. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002).
169. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11
(2003); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808
(1991); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
170. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. "With respect to retribution-the interest in
seeing that the offender gets his "just deserts"-the severity of the appropriate punishment
necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender." Id.
171. See generally, JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE
SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (University of California Press, Ltd., 2002).
172. 985 F.2d 1284 (4th Cir. 1993).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3), which reads, in relevant part:
[Wihoever, with the intent -
(A) to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity;
(B) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or
control of property believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity; or
(C) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal
law, conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving
property represented by a law enforcement officer to be the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity, or property used to conduct or facilitate
specified unlawful activity, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for
not more than 20 years, or both.
174. McLamb, 985 F.2d at 1287.
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Amendment prohibits punishment of harmless behavior.' 75 The court,
citing Powell, explained that as long as the crime involves an act and
some level of intent, and does not depend on the accused's status, the
conviction does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 176 The
court explicitly stated that they would not question the legislature's
judgment that the conduct was harmful as long as (1) the act and intent
elements were satisfied, and (2) the law was rationally related to the
furtherance of a legitimate state interest. 177 In other words, McLamb's
actions, committed with a guilty mind, properly invoke the moral
condemnation of the community; therefore, his punishment did not
violate the Eighth Amendment. Regardless of whether McLamb's
claim that his conduct was harmless and, therefore, unpunishable, is
true, the Seventh Amendment approach has been satisfied, thus
preventing the courts from invading the legislature's territory.
A. Presumptions Flowing from Acts
In Brinkley v. State, the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed
the appellant's conviction for selling liquor within four miles of an
operating school. 178 The fact that the defendant obtained a federal
license to sell alcohol was the key to his conviction because it
established a presumption that he, in fact, sold alcohol.'
79
Furthermore, Brinkley was legally prevented from rebutting that
presumption by asserting that the prosecution should have been
compelled to prove that an actual sale occurred. 180 At first blush, it
appears that this case would violate the requirements advocated in this
article. However, this case serves as an excellent example of how
unobtrusive this doctrine could be.
Cases like Brinkley illustrate that the law has long recognized
two types of mens rea. Specific intent is the most well-known and
least controversial. The second type is closely intertwined with the act
requirement-it is the foreseeability-based intent that has been
recognized for centuries by the felony-murder doctrine and is currently
recognized as recklessness in the Model Penal Code. 181 Since the
felony-murder doctrine was recognized long before the Bill of Rights
175. Id. at 1291-92.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1292.
178. Brinkley v. State, 125 Tenn. 371 (1911).
179. Id. at 383.
180. Id. at 383-84.
181. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
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was ratified, 182 reckless intent must be held to satisfy the mens rea
requirement if the quasi-Seventh Amendment approach is adopted.
The Brinkley court clarified its holding by placing the
defendant's act and the statute in proper perspective. Such a law,
having for its effect a denial of the party charged of the right to rebut
and overcome the presumption created by it, would be void. So would
a law which made an act prima facie evidence of crime over which the
party charged had no control, and with which he had no connection; or
which made an act prima facie evidence of crime which had no
relation to a criminal act, and no tendency of itself to prove the
ultimate fact of guilt.
1 83
None of these deficiencies applied to the Tennessee statute.
Granted, it is difficult to rebut the presumption created by obtaining
the license-Brinkley would be limited to arguing either that he did
not obtain a license or that his home was not actually within four miles
of a school-but rebuttal is possible. -Also, there is no doubt that the
defendant had total control over obtaining the license or that the
license bore a reasonable connection to a criminal act. As the Brinkley
court noted, the presumption of guilt was created by the defendant's
act of obtaining the license, not by any status or mere circumstance.'
84
Any punishment, therefore, was not cruel and unusual, and did not
violate the state constitution. 185, 186 In sum, the conviction relied on an
intentional act that was completely within the defendant's discretion.
Just like a felony-murder scenario, the ultimate crime may not have
been intended, but it was reasonably foreseeable; therefore, imposing
criminal liability was appropriate.
B. The Model Penal Code's Mental States Satisfy the Mens Rea
Requirement
The proposed approach to Eighth Amendment limitations
respects federalism concerns by allowing the states to continue to
develop substantive law as long as the intent and act requirements are
satisfied. Choosing to adopt the Model Penal Code's mental states
182. Norval Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA.
L. REV. 50, 58 (1956). Morris cites Lord Dacre's case, Moore 86, 72 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B.
1535), to show that the felony-murder doctrine was first used in the Sixteenth Century.
183. Brinkley, 125 Tenn. at 385.
184. Id. at 383-84.
185. Id. at 384.
186. TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 16 reads, "That excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
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would be part of this process and, therefore, is constitutionally
permissible, but not required, under the quasi-Seventh Amendment
approach. 18 7  After all, the Model Penal Code is merely a
reconfiguration of the common law standards recognized by the Eighth
Amendment.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in White v. Am 188 is an excellent
example of how this concept works in practice. After Ohio adopted
the Model Penal Code's mental states, White alleged that criminal
intent and voluntariness were still elements of every crime.' 89  The
court asserted that the common law requirement of mens rea had been
replaced and refined, not eliminated. 190  In other words, Ohio's
adoption of the Model Penal Code's intent standards merely modified
the common law standard.
C. How the Suggested Standard Would Affect Existing Law
Despite what has been presented thus far, the law would not
remain stagnant. Most notably, the Court's decision that claims of
actual innocence cannot be brought under the Eighth Amendment
187. It may be required under the activist approach, but only the future decision makers
would know. As with any outwardly activist approach, it is hard to discern what is and what is
not required without any previous indication from the Court.
188. 788 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1986).
189. Id. at 345. White also asserted that criminal conduct, unlawfulness, and disrupting
the "Peace and Dignity" of the state were also required elements of every crime.
190. Id. at 346. See also, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22 (A-D) (2004), which reads:
(A) A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a
certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against
conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to
accomplish thereby, it is his specific intention to engage in conduct of that
nature.
(B) A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware
that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of
a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is
aware that such circumstances probably exist.
(C) A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the
consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is
likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A
person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless
indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk
that such circumstances are likely to exist.
(D) A person acts negligently when, because of a substantial lapse from
due care, he fails to perceive or avoid a risk that his conduct may cause a
certain result or may be of a certain nature. A person is negligent with
respect to circumstances when, because of a substantial lapse from due
care, he fails to perceive or avoid a risk that such circumstances may exist.
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would be overturned. 191  New York has already come to that
conclusion under its due process' 92  and cruel and unusual
punishment' 93 clauses. 94  As the New York Court of Appeals noted,
confinement of an innocent "violates elemental fairness" and "is
disproportionate to the ... lack of crime."' 95  An adoption of a
substantive Eighth Amendment would require the Court to follow New
York's example.
Another required change would be to prohibit strict liability
offenses from satisfying the intent requirement when such offenses
191. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
192. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous
crime (except in cases of impeachment, and in cases of militia when in
actual service, and the land, air and naval forces in time of war, or which
this state may keep with the consent of congress in time of peace, and in
cases of petit larceny under the regulation of the legislature), unless on
indictment of a grand jury, except that a person held for the action of a
grand jury upon a charge for such an offense, other than one punishable by
death or life imprisonment, with the consent of the district attorney, may
waive indictment by a grand jury and consent to be prosecuted on an
information filed by the district attorney; such waiver shall be evidenced
by written instrument signed by the defendant in open court in the
presence of his or her counsel. In any trial in any court whatever the party
accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel
as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him or her. No
person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense;
nor shall he or she be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself or herself, providing, that any public officer who, upon
being called before a grand jury to testify concerning the conduct of his or
her present office or of any public office held by him or her within five
years prior to such grand jury call to testify, or the performance of his or
her official duties in any such present or prior offices, refuses to sign a
waiver of immunity against subsequent criminal prosecution, or to answer
any relevant question concerning such matters before such grand jury,
shall by virtue of such refusal, be disqualified from holding any other
public office or public employment for a period of five years from the date
of such refusal to sign a waiver of immunity against subsequent
prosecution, or to answer any relevant question concerning such matters
before such grand jury, and shall be removed from his or her present office
by the appropriate authority or shall forfeit his or her present office at the
suit of the attorney-general.
193. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5 reads, "Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive
fines imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be
unreasonably detained."
194. People v. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d 477 (2003).
195. Id. at 485.
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involve no "mental culpability."' 196  Punishment under these
circumstances "shock[s] the sense of justice of the community"
because the offender's mental state does not rise to the level of the
Model Penal Code's negligent or reckless levels. 197 If the offender's
mental state does not rise to these levels, the crime is inherently less
serious than if it was committed with some evil intent, even if the harm
caused is the same.
1 98
For example, the Eighth Amendment would require at least a
showing of criminal negligence when a misdemeanor is used as the
basis of an involuntary manslaughter charge. 199 If the offender failed
to avoid creating certain dangerous circumstances or failed to foresee a
risk that a reasonable person would have seen, the negligence standard
would be satisfied and the Eighth Amendment would not prohibit
punishing the offender. 200 The bottom line is, as with all criminal
offenses, the intent requirement must be proven, not assumed. If the
underlying offense requires some sufficient level of intent, the Eighth
Amendment is satisfied.20 ' If the result is unintended and
unforeseeable, the Eighth Amendment serves as a bar to
punishment.
20 2
D. Constitutionalizing Insanity?
If the Robinson holding had been extended in Powell, the
ability of a mentally ill defendant to raise the insanity defense almost
certainly would have been held to be a constitutionally protected
203right. Indeed, Kent Greenawalt, among others, did not believe,
before Powell was decided, that the insanity defense could be
204abolished. Not only would states not be permitted to abolish the
insanity defense, but the Court would be flooded with cases whenever
the states sought to regulate the admissibility of evidence offered to
prove "disease" and "compulsion," since these terms were not clearly
196. State v. Campbell, 117 Ohio App. 3d 762, 765 (1997) (holding that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment clauses of both the Ohio Constitution and the U.S. Constitution prohibit
the imposition of grossly disproportionate punishments).
197. Id. at 768.
198. Id.
199. State v. Yarborough, 905 P.2d 209, 214 (1995).
200. Campbell, 117 Ohio App. 3d at 771.
201. Id. at 770.
202. Id. at 766.
203. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 545 (1968).
204. Dressier, supra note 15, at 1531.
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defined in Robinson.20 5 The Court's greatest problem, however, would
be which form of the insanity defense to adopt.
20 6
1. The Argument for Constitutionalizing the Insanity Defense
"The United States Supreme Court has never held that there is
a constitutional right to plead an insanity defense., 20 7 Additionally,
the Court has never extended constitutional protection to any subset of
insanity, including the irresistible impulse test.20 8  All this would
change, however, if the Court adopts the activist approach and
constitutionalizes the insanity defense.
Those who have advocated for such a course of action have
argued on deterrence grounds. Specifically stated, punishing those
who are unable to appreciate the nature or consequences of their
conduct is pointless. Imprisoning defendants who cannot conform
their conduct to behave legally serves no deterrent purpose, because
the prisoner is undeterrable.2 , In the language of due process, the
insanity defense in general, and the irresistible impulse test
specifically, are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty;" and
therefore constitutionally protected.
210
2. Historical Analysis
Insanity was not recognized as a defense independent of the
mens rea doctrine when the Constitution was ratified;211 therefore, the
insanity defense would not be protected by the Eighth Amendment if
the Seventh Amendment Model is adopted. Notably, primitive forms
of the insanity defense operated similarly to the systems currently used
by the states which have statutorily abolished the insanity defense.
2 12
Some jurists have argued that some form of the insanity
defense can be traced back to the late Thirteenth Century.213 The
criminal responsibility test enunciated by Lambard in 1581 was
essentially used to determine whether the allegedly insane defendant
205. Powell, 392 U.S. at 546.
206. Dressier, supra note 15, at 1524-25.
207. State v. Korell, 213 Mont. 316, 327 (t984).
208. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (requiring a defendant to prove insanity
beyond a reasonable doubt does not offend due process).
209. State v. Cowan, 260 Mont. 510, 519 (1993) (Trieweiler, J. dissenting).
210. Id.
211. See infra text accompanying notes 213-18.
212. See infra text accompanying notes 220-226.
213. State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 646 (1990) (McDevitt, J. dissenting).
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could have formed criminal intent. 214  The same is true of the test
offered by Dalton in 1630, which was no more than a general rule that
•215
the insane are unable to satisfy the mens rea requirement. By the
early 1700s, the test had morphed to include parts of what would
become the irresistible impulse test.
216
A century later, the developing insanity defense took a step
back by disregarding the irresistible impulse test and shifting its focus
to whether the defendant could determine whether his actions were
right or wrong. 21 7  This version of the insanity test would become
known as the M'Naughten test.21 8 In other words, what scholars have
regarded as the first true insanity test, M'Naughten, was not adopted
until 1843, well after the Constitution was ratified. Also, the
predecessors to the modem day insanity test did not differ significantly
from the mens rea requirement and were far from stable enough to be
regarded as established at the time the Eighth Amendment was
ratified.
The degree to which the insane would be affected by the
potential abolition of insanity, however, is uncertain. The state would
still be required to prove the intent element, so evidence that the
defendant could not form the requisite mental intent would still be
admissible. Some states have already eliminated the insanity
defense 2 19 and can be examined to determine exactly how the
suggested approach would affect the insane.
3. Responsibility Without Insanity in Montana and Idaho
Although Idaho has statutorily abolished the insanity defense,
the state Supreme Court has adopted an intent requirement by holding
that only the criminally responsible may be convicted.22 °
Additionally, the statute abolishing insanity does not prohibit
214. Id. at 646-47 (quoting Lambard, Eirenarcha or of the Office of the Justices of the
Peace at Cap. 21.218).
215. Id. at 647 (quoting Dalton, The Country Justice, 244 (1630)).
216. WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN Vol. I, p. 1 (1724).
"The guilt of offending against any Law whatsoever, necessarily supporting a willful
disobedience, can never justly be imputed to those who are either incapable of understanding
it, or of conforming themselves to it." Id.
217. Bellingham's Case, I Collinson on Lunacy 636, 671 (1812).
218. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.1843).
219. IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (1) (Michie 2004) reads, "Mental condition shall not be a
defense to any charge of criminal conduct." MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-214 (1979).
220. State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 621 (1985); State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 854
(1992).
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defendants from presenting evidence of their mental state to refute the
state's evidence of criminal intent.2  Montana has also statutorily
adopted the common law voluntary act requirement for any offense.2 22
Montana courts have interpreted "voluntary act" as a statutory
preservation of the mens rea and actus reus requirements. 22  As in
Idaho, evidence of a defendant's mental deficiency is admissible to
prove that the accused could not have formed the requisite criminal
224intent. In sum, the mens rea requirement has been preserved,
thereby maintaining a defense for insane persons.
In these instances, irresistible impulse is not directly addressed,
but the classic standard offered by the mens rea requirement has been
preserved. At first blush, this approach may seem rather harsh, but
some commentators have noted that abolishing insanity may have
actually eased the burden for insane defendants.225 Instead of proving
their insanity beyond a reasonable doubt or by clear and convincing
evidence, the insane only need to create a reasonable doubt as to their
ability to form intent in order to be acquitted.
2 2 6
X. CONCLUSION
Robinson still can be built upon. A proper reading of Robinson
and Powell shows that: (1) Powell reaffirms the act prong of
Robinson; and (2) Powell mandates that Robinson's status prong not
be expanded recklessly. Since the act prong is still recognized long
after Powell, the Supreme Court can expand upon the logical
underpinnings of the Eighth Amendment that rely on a theory of moral
blameworthiness and retributive punishment that the Court continues
to embrace. Limiting this theory via the quasi-Seventh Amendment
approach-constitutionally protecting only those common law rights
that were acknowledged at the time the Constitution was ratified-
would appeal to the federalism concerns expressed in Powell and
allow the states to retain control over the development of substantive
criminal law. In sum, the proposed extension of Robinson would
221. Potter v. State, 114 Idaho 612, 613 (1988).
222. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-202 (2004) states, "A material element of every offense is
a voluntary act .... See also, State v. Korell, 213 Mont. 316, 337 (1984).
223. State v. Korell, 213 Mont. 316, 337 (1984).
224. Id. at 322.
225. Id.at331.
226. Id.
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provide important substantive protections without drastically changing
the current state of criminal law.
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